Op-Ed: Diane Rinaldo: Build the future of PNT on the facts and on current security threats

America’s global positioning system (GPS) enables the country’s national and economic security in ways both appreciated and unrecognized. It is an enabling technology, not unlike electricity, and it powers the modern world — everything from ATMs to gas pumps, and everywhere from global financial markets to America’s military relies on the timing signals from satellites orbiting the world. That little blue dot on your smartphone is linked to a lot more than you realize.

While other countries have tried to develop competing systems, GPS remains leaps ahead of its rivals. Its dominance also happens to be its weakness. It is a fragile system, and one without any redundancy. That fragility was once a real, but hypothetical vulnerability. Russia and China could certainly target orbiting GPS satellites in a time of conflict, as well as jam or spoof the signals, but the threat only manifested itself in narrow situations. That is no longer the case.

The era of war against GPS is here, and it is here to stay.

Just last year, Grant Shapps, the then-Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom, had his flight’s GPS signal jammed when flying near Russia. Finnair, Finland’s airline, had to suspend flights to Tartu, Estonia due to Russian signal disruption. Thousands of flights across the Baltic Sea have had their signals jammed by Russian electronic warfare. Reports also indicate that commercial flights near China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels have had their GPS signals interfered with in the Pacific.

The danger is clear and present. I recently submitted a report to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) highlighting examples that bring this risk into sharp focus:

As the report states, “Federal government bodies…have repeatedly warned of the dangers of jamming and spoofing, and with good reason. U.S. adversaries around the world are jamming and spoofing GPS signals at an alarming rate, and in some cases directly targeting the U.S. military. Jamming and spoofing is an increasingly dangerous concern for civilian infrastructure in the United States as well, particularly as jamming devices have become cheap and widely available. Lawmakers have acknowledged the threat and are beginning to demand action.” [emphasis added]

America’s adversaries know the value and importance of GPS and are working to build their own to ensure their position, navigation, and timing (PNT) is not reliant on American assets and to enable their own national and economic security. China, Russia, and Iran have prioritized developing GNSS backups and complements to secure their own national interests from sabotage or conflict. And all three have conducted Navigation Warfare, referred to in the military as Navwar — operations against GPS.

Washington is, unfortunately, behind the curve. Despite years of bipartisan concern from policymakers, military leaders, and industry experts, Washington has lagged in building complementary or backup PNT systems. The United States should take a page from its adversaries’ playbook and prioritize back-up and alternative PNT.

Fortunately, the current administration has prioritized this issue. Under the leadership of President Donald Trump, the FCC has taken a critical step toward shoring up GPS by exploring both terrestrial and space-based technologies that can serve as a complement and backup if GPS satellite signals go dark. FCC Chairman Brendan Carr’s recent bipartisan vote to initiate a formal inquiry is the culmination of work by Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Ed Markey (D., Mass.) and marks the five-year anniversary of President Donald Trump’s Executive Order directing federal agencies to strengthen PNT resilience. Chairman Carr spoke about this effort extensively with Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R., Tenn.) on her podcast Unmuted, this spring.

The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry identifies three specific terrestrial technologies that could form the foundation of a system of systems approach — one that strengthens PNT resilience while creating layered redundancy. One of those technologies is eLoran. Another is Broadcast Positioning System. A third is NextNav, which has proposed a scalable, terrestrial system that can be integrated into existing 5G networks and consumer mobile devices by leveraging the power and scale of 5G and mobile network operator partnerships, eliminating the need for any taxpayer cost burden.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this challenge. In fact, pursuing a sole solution will recreate the same redundancy and fragility problem America faces with GPS today — a single point of failure. Developing such a multi-faceted solution requires a clear appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of each, and unfortunately, right now, that comparison is artificially skewed by narrow special interests.

Adopting a 5G based terrestrial PNT system requires no build out, no taxpayer funding, and no new legislation — a win-win from a fiscal and legislative perspective, to say nothing of the time-savings that will result. Others, with questionable links to the CCP, have suggested that a 5G solution will interfere with unlicensed devices. Yet, interestingly, no meaningful technical analysis has been filed with the FCC. The opposition is based less on technical facts and more on competitive self-interest.

A 5G-based terrestrial PNT technology could enhance national security and public safety, enable faster emergency response, and protect the vital infrastructure our economy depends on as part of a system-of-systems approach that includes other technologies including eLoran and BPS, while still enabling unlicensed devices to operate in the band without being subject to unacceptable interference.

If a threat is defined as a capability and intent, America’s adversaries clearly have the means to attack GPS and have demonstrated their intention to do so. Washington cannot afford to allow narrow interests to prevent the development of a robust, multi-faceted solution to build redundancy in this most critical of technologies.

Diane Rinaldo of Peake Advisors, is one of the country’s leading authorities on 5G, telecommunications supply chain security, and privacy. She served as Acting Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information in the first Trump Administration.